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Abstract 
Intelligent Information systems do not usually 
possess complete information about the world with 
which they interact. The AGM paradigm has 
become one of the standard frameworks for modeling 
changes to repositories of information. Its principal 
constructions for change operators rely on some form 
of underlying preference relation. The process of 
changing such a preference relation is known as 
a transmutation. Spohn's conditionalization can 
be interpreted as a transmutation that imposes a 
relative minimal change. A transmutation based on 
an absolute minimal change is an adjustment. 
In this paper we develop a notion of explanation 
using transmutations of information systems. Fol-
lowing Gardenfors lead we recast Spohn's notion of 
reason for within the general setting of transmuta-
tions and extend this to characterize most plausible 
explanations. We also investigate the relationship 
between explanation based on abduction and Spoh-
nian reasons based on adjustments. Finally, and 
rather surprisingly, we identify explicit conditions 
that characterize the various forms of explanations 
identified by Boutilier and Becher using Spohnian 
reasons. 
1 Introduction 
Information systems use information theoretic descrip-
tions to capture their view of the world. These descrip-
tions are generally incomplete and evolve over time. An 
intelligent information system requires a mechanism for 
self-modification when new information about the world 
is acquired. 
The AGM paradigm [Alchourron ti ai, 1985; Gardenfors, 
1988; Gardenfors and Makinson, 1988] has become a 
standard framework for modeling information change. In 
particular, it provides a mechanism for the revision and 
contraction of information. Within the AGM paradigm, 
the family of revision functions and the family of con-
traction functions are constrained by rationality postu-
lates. The logical properties of a body of information 
are not strong enough to uniquely determine a revi-
sion or contraction function. Therefore, the principal 
constructions for these functions rely on some form of 
underlying preference relation, such as a family of se-
lection functions [Alchourron ei ai, 1985], a system of 
spheres [Grove, 1988], a nice preorder on models [Kat-
suno and Mendelzon, 1992; Peppas and Williams, 1995], 
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or an epistemic entrenchment ordering [Gardenfors and 
Makinson, 1988]. In this light we consider an informa-
tion system to be composed of a set of information to-
gether with a preference relation. 
We refer to the process of changing the underlying 
preference relation of an information system as a trans-
mutation. Based on observations made by Gardenfors 
[1988, p72], Williams [1994a] generalized the conditional-
lzations of Spohn [1988] to more general transmutations. 
Spohn represents an information system using ordinal 
conditional functions, which map possible worlds to ordi-
nals, and argues that conditionalization, which is a con-
structive method for modifying an ordinal conditional 
function, is a reasonable procedure. Williams explored 
conditionalization further and examined an alternative 
construction; an adjustment. Both conditionalizations 
and adjustments are transmutations. Intuitively, condi-
tionalization involves a relative minimal change neces-
sary to effect the revision or contraction, whilst adjust-
ment involves an absolute minimal change. 
Spohn characterizes the notion of reason for in [1983] 
and shows how it can be captured within his framework 
in [1983; 1988]. 
The objective of this paper is, firstly, to recast 
Spohn's notion of reason for in a more general setting 
using transmutations rather than conditionalizations, 
and secondly, to extend this approach to determine 
most plausible explanations. Some preliminary work 
in this direction using a theory base representation 
can be found in [Williams, 1994b]. We also provide 
an intuitively appealing and transparent relationship 
between explanation based on abduction and Spohnian 
reasons based on adjustments. Finally and quite 
surprisingly, we find explicit conditions which capture 
the relationship between Spohnian reasons and the 
various forms of explanation identified by Boutilier and 
Becher [1995]. 
In section 2, we describe entrenchment rankings, while 
in section 3 we define transmutations of entrenchment 
rankings, and describe a particular type of transmuta-
tion, namely an adjustment. In section 4, we outline 
Spohn's notion of reason for, and provide conditions 
which allow this notion to be defined using both arbi-
trary transmutations and adjustments. In the spirit of 
Spohn we provide a notion of most plausible explanation. 
In section 5 we will illustrate some of our definitions and 
results with examples. In section 6 we compare our no-
tion of explanation with one based upon the process of 
abductive inference. We discuss related work in section 
822 KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION 2 Entrenchment Rankings 
Spohn [1988] introduced ordinal conditional functions, 
while Williams [1994a] introduced related structures, 
namely entrenchment rankings (defined below). Essen-
tially, ordinal conditional functions take possible worlds 
to ordinals, whereas entrenchment rankings take sen-
tences to ordinals. Both define a ranking of the respec-
tive domains which provides a response schema for all 
"possible consistent information" [Spohn, 1988]. 
The higher the ordinal assigned to a sentence by 
an entrenchment ranking the more firmly held it is. 
Throughout the remainder of this paper it will be 
understood that O is an ordinal chosen to be sufficiently 
large for the purpose of the discussion. 
\ 
An entrenchment ranking represents a well-ranked 
epistemic entrenchment ordering [Gardenfors, 1988; 
Gardenfors and Makinson, 19881 where the higher the 
ordinal assigned to a sentence the more entrenched it 
is. The ordinal assignment can be used and viewed in 
two ways: (i) qualitatively, that is as a specification of 
a relative ordering of sentences, or (ii) quantitatively, 
that is as an assignment of intrinsic utility for each 
sentence. For a discussion of various assignment scales 
see [Gardenfors and Makinson, 1994]. 
Entrenchment rankings are information systems; a 
set of information together with a (necessarily well-
ordered) preference relation. We denote the family 
of all entrenchment rankings by S. An information 
set represented by an entrenchment ranking is the 
set of sentences whose degree of acceptance is greater 
than zero. Formally we have the following definition 
[Williams, 1994a]. 
We refer to information whose degree of acceptance is 
zero as the non-beliefs, and information with a degree 
of acceptance greater than zero as the beliefs. We note 
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that set(E) is a theory, and hence the set of beliefs are 
closed with respect to logical consequence. 
3 Transmutations 
Peppas [1993] introduced well-behaved revision functions 
and provided a construction using a well-ordered 
system of spheres [Grove, 1988]. Williams [1994a] 
gives representation theorems for entrenchment rankings 
and well-behaved change operators. In particular, 
she provided conditions which characterize both well-
behaved contraction and well-behaved revision operators 
using an entrenchment ranking, and conversely. An 
extra postulate is required for the change operator to 
be constructed from a well-ranked preference relation. 
The informational input for AGM contraction and 
revision functions for theories is a sentence alone. In 
contrast, when modifying an entrenchment ranking we 
require both a sentence and an ordinal. Consequently, 
the informational input for transmutations is a sentence 
a and an ordinal t. The interpretation being 
[Gardenfors, 19881 that a represents the information to 
be accepted by tne information system, and i is the 
degree of firmness with which this information is to be 
incorporated into the transmuted information system. 
We define a transmutation schema [Williams, 1994a] for 
entrenchment rankings below. 
For a contingent sentence a and an ordinal i, we say 
E*(a,i) is an (a, i)-transmutation of E. It was shown 
in {Williams, 1994a], that according to the definition 
above, E*(a,i) is an entrenchment ranking where a 
is assigned the degree of acceptance i, and if i is 
greater than zero then set(E*(a, i)J is the well-behaved 
revision (set(E))* constructed in tne obvious way from 
the epistemic entrenchment ordering derived from the 
relative ordering given by E. Similarly, if i is zero then 
set(E*(a, i)) is the well-behaved contraction (set(E))~. 
Adjustments (defined belcw) were introduced in 
[Williams, 1994a]. They are transmutations which adopt 
an absolute measure under the the principle of minimal 
change. In particular, an entrenchment ranking is 
changed or disturbed, in an absolute sense, as little as 
necessary to give a the degree of acceptance i. That is, 
each sentence is reassigned an ordinal as close as possible 
to its previous ordinal assignment such that the resultant 
structure is an entrenchment ranking. An adjustment is 
based on intuition similar to that used by Boutilier [1993] 
to specify his natural revision; namely the principle of 
minimal change. According to Boutilier "when certain 
beliefs must be given up, it seems natural to try to keep 
not only important beliefs, but as much of the ordering 
as Dossible". 4 Explanation 
Spohn [1983] gave the following interpretation of a being 
a reason for B: 
(R1) a is a reason for B iff raising the epistemic rank 
of a would raise the epistemic rank of B. 
Gardenfors [1990] translated Spohnian reasons into 
the AGM paradigm. However, in contrast to the 
translation we give later based on transmutations, his 
translation based on revision and contraction alone is 
somewhat artificial since the epistemic rank after a 
revision or contraction is undetermined. Essentially, 
his interpretation is that a is a reason for B if and 
only if B is not retained in the contraction of a. In 
the same paper Gardenfors identifies two problems with 
this translation. Firstly he demonstrates that difficulties 
with the circularity of reasons arise, and secondly that 
multiple reasons for B cannot be modeled satisfactorily. 
These problems are discussed further by Olsson [1994] 
where an alternative solution to ours can be found, based 
on a comparative measure of epistemic entrenchment 
orderings for different theories. We note that the 
solution we present based on transmutations does not 
suffer from either of these problems. 
Before recasting (RI) using transmutations, some 
remarks are in order. Firstly, the determination of this 
condition is dependent on the type of transmutation 
employed since it will determine changes in epistemic 
rank for all sentences. We contend that an adjustment 
is appropriate for determining reasons on the basis that 
it is a transmutation which performs an absolute minimal 
change. In particular, every sentence is reassigned a new 
ordinal as close to its previous assignment as is consistent 
with the desired change. When the epistemic rank of a is 
increased it seems reasonable to require that this change 
should disturb the background information system as 
little as possible. 
Secondly, we wish to distingish two types of reasons: 
(i) ordinary reasons, for which there exists an ordinal 
to which a can be raised, leading to an increase in the 
degree of B, and (ii) strong reasons, for which raising the 
degree of a by any amount leads to an increase in the 
degree of B. 
Following Gardenfors' lead, we can rewrite (RI) 
using the notion of transmutation, and the degree of 
acceptance to capture both types of reasons: 
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One method currently gaining popularity for defining 
the notion of explanation is that of abductive reasoning 
[Paul, 1993; Stickel, 1991]. Abduction is a form of logical 
inference that aims to derive plausible explanations for 
information and is, in fact, often described as inference 
to the best explanation. 
An abductive inference proceeds by proposing or 
generating hypotheses which would account for, or 
explain a group of facts. A common way of defining 
explanation as an abductive inference is the following 
(see [Paul, 1993], for example — however, note that we 
ao not adopt his restriction to abducibles). 
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both explanations for and is also an explanation for 
7 then the more specific explanation a is more plausible 
if This can be generalised 
for longer chains of explanation to yield a method for 
determining the preferred level of specificity. 
7 Related Work 
Recently Gardenfors [1988] as well as Boutilier and 
Becher [1995] have given related accounts of explanation. 
Gardenfors uses changes in probability, whilst we use 
changes in plausibility. The relationship between 
Boutilier and Becher's work and that presented in this 
paper is somewhat unexpected because both approaches 
draw their intuitions from seemingly different directions, 
indeed opposite directions. In particular, our analysis 
focuses on changes at the preference relation level 
whilst Boutilier and Becher's analysis considers the 
behaviour at the informational content level. However 
their underlying similarity appears to stem from the 
committment to the principle of minimal change. 
Boutilier and Becher use an explicit assumption that 
explanations for beliefs are beliefs, and explanations 
for non-beliefs are non-beliefs. By way of justification 
they say that observations in their framework are not 
accepted into an information set until some explanation 
is found and accepted. Our idea of coherence is related 
to this assumption. For instance, according to it 
the only explanations for non-beliefs are non-beliefs. 
However, it does allow beliefs to have non-beliefs as 
explanations, a trait which is more in keeping with the 
usual interpretation of abductive explanations. Using 
Corollary 2 and the connections below one can show 
that Boutilier and Becher's explanations respect our idea 
of coherence, and therefore their assumption is stronger 
than that of coherence due to the restriction that only 
beliefs can be explanations for beliefs. 
Boutilier and Becher's definition of a explains B, 
although restricted to the propositional case and based 
on the assumption above, is closely related to a is a 
reason for B based on adjustments. In particular, if their 
explanations are based on a well-ranked CO revision 
model structure [Boutilier, 1993] then we have: 
In contradistinction to reasons based on adjustments, 
Boutilier and Becher's explanations preclude non-beliefs 
being explanations for accepted beliefs. In particular, 
according to Boutilier and Becher if and 
then a cannot explain but on our account 
a could be a reason for Consequently, the notion of 
reason for based on adjustment is more general. 
Clearly, the connections described above may not 
hold if transmutations other than adjustments are 
used to determine reasons. In this sense, Spohnian 
reasons specified by (R2) are far more general than 
the explanations of Boutilier and Becher, because 
their notion of explanation essentially corresponds to 
reasons based on a particular transmutation; namely, an 
adjustment. 
Boutilier and Becher argue that preferred explanations 
are those that are most plausible; they require the least 
change in the information set in order to be accepted. 
In particular, they maintain as much information as 
possible, including as much default information as 
possible. 
Their notion of plausibility is very different to the 
notion of plausibility advocated in this paper, where we 
claim that the most plausible explanation is one that 
is capable of increasing the degree of acceptance of the 
explanandum the most. For them, if a and are both 
beliefs and explanations for another belief then they 
are equally preferred. In other words, within Boutilier 
and Becher's framework factual explanations can not be 
ranked on the basis of plausibility. Consequently, OUT 
notion of plausibility is substantially more discerning. 
Boutilier and Becher highlight the desirable defeasible 
character of their explanations. Spohnian reasons 
based on adjustments also exhibit this feature, and 
moreover they give rise to consistency preserving rational 
consequence relations. In particular, if we define 
to be a is a reason for based on an adjustment, then 
|~ is consistency preserving and rational. Consequently, 
there exists a nice preference structure [Gardenfors and 
Makinson, 19941 and an expectation ordering which 
induces reasons based on adjustments. 
Given the transparent connection between entrench-
ment rankings and expectation orderings [Williams, 
1995b] we can give the following intuitive interpretation 
of reason for in terms of expectations. We can say that 
a is a reason for if is strictly more expected 
than either and that a is a strong reason for 
if in addition a and are equally expected. Similar 
readings can be given for plausibility and specificity. 
Williams [1995a] gives a computational model for 
adjustments which can be used to implement Spohnian 
reasons, abductive, predictive, factual, hypothetical and 
counterfactual explanations. 
Spohn [1988] revised his notion of reason for, and gave 
a condition which is equivalent [Williams, 1994a] to the 
condition below (it is related to conditionalization). 
Intuitively, this condition says that a is a reason lor 
(3 iff B has a higher degree of acceptance, or degree 
of plausibility given a rather than given [Spohn, 
1988]. However, this condition leads to counterintuitive 
results; sentences turn out to be reasons simply by virtue 
of the fact they are strictly more plausible than the 
explanandum. Therefore we can say that reasons based 
on the condition above do not respect the notion of 
coherence introduced in section 4. 
8 Discussion 
Transmutations of an information system describe not 
only how a set of information is revised, but how the 
underlying preference structure is revised. Consequently, 
it is possible to capture Spohn's notion of reason using 
transmutations. Indeed we would obtain a different 
characterization of a Spohnian reason for every type of 
transmutation. 
826 KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION An adjustment is a transmutation that involves an ab-
solute minimal change. That is, the underlying prefer-
ence relation is changed as little as necessary to effect 
the required change in epistemic rank. For this reason 
we have argued that an adjustment is an appropriate 
transmutation for determining explanations because in 
the determination of an explanation we would normally 
require that such a change disturb the background in-
formation system as little as necessary. The suitability 
of using an adjustment for Spohnian reasons is further 
supported by its perspicuous connection with the com-
prehensive work of Boutilier and Becher. 
We showed how an adjustment can be used to 
determine a most plausible explanation, by selecting an 
explanation that is capable of raising the epistemic rank 
of the explanandum the most. This notion is more 
discerning than that given by Boutilier and Becher whose 
method suffers from the problem of not being able to 
rank the plausibility of factual explanations. 
We contrasted Spohnian reasons based on adjustment 
with a common definition of explanation in terms of ab-
ductive reasoning. We noted that the determination of 
reasons based on adjustments are carried out qualita-
tively using the relative ordering of the background in-
formation system itself, and the associated nonmono-
tonic consequence relation is consistency preserving and 
rational. 
Future work will explore the relevance of competing ex-
planations [Gardenfors, 1993] and the strengths of com-
peting explanations using the quantitative information 
encapsulated in an entrenchment ranking. Preliminary 
results suggest these are promising directions to pursue. 
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